This paper analyzes the incidence of agricultural commodity programs. Producers advocate commodity programs and receive price subsidies, but free entry and perfectly elastic supplies of nonland inputs ensure that landowners extract the entire surplus from price subsidies. Moreover, an increase in the target price raises the land rent more than proportionately. Although landless producers benefit from commodity programs in the short run, they do not in the long run. Roughly 60 percent of program benefits go to producers who own land, and the remainder to landowners. 
rent adjustment, the long-run incidence is determined by the proportion of farmland owned by producers.
In this article we investigate the short-run and long-run incidences of commodity program benefits. We assume that nonland inputs are supplied by competitive firms and that the long-run supplies of the nonland inputs are perfectly elastic. Free entry insures that in long-run equilibrium all benefits accrue to landowners. This increase in the rental price of land permits landowners to extract the entire producer surplus.6 Moreover, long-run equilibrium land rent rises more than proportionately with increases in the target price.
II. Price Supports and Land Demand
Our analysis is based on a stylized scenario of agricultural production with the following assumptions. c) Price subsidy. To study the long-run impacts of commodity programs, target prices are assumed to be maintained by a price subsidy rather than by a buffer stock. d) Identical producers. Producers are assumed to use identical production technology. e) Two primary inputs. Producers obtain output q by using two primary inputs, land L and the nonland input X. The nonland input X is a composite input including labor, chemicals, and capital equipment used in agriculture but excluding land.
If there are no fixed inputs, free entry implies that a price subsidy program is not sustainable because the government cost can increase without limit. However, as Gary S. Becker asserts, the government is compelled to control its cost because rising dead weight costs and increasing government cost curtail the political power of subsidy recipients.8 Assumption b acknowledges that to contain the program cost the government limits eligible producers by controlling the supply of eligible land in U.S. commodity programs.
Assumption c eliminates the complications arising from buffer stocks and attendant storage cost problems.9 In practice, the government may hold some inventories in long-run equilibrium. For example, an equilibrium buffer stock may be established such that its size does not change from period to period. However, the government will not alter the size of buffer stock when the market is in stationary longrun equilibrium. For this reason buffer stocks are not included in the analysis. Producers may differ in farm size and production cost. The sole purpose of assumption d is to investigate the behavior of the representative producer in long-run equilibrium.1o Thus, all producers are assumed to participate in the commodity program. The total land, A, eligible for program benefits is assumed to be fixed in the short run but is positively related to land rent in the long run.
The time sequence of the model is as follows: at the beginning of the period (t = 0) farmers observe the target price of output p* and other input prices and commit on the choice of land L. A farmer may lease land from or to other farmers, depending on whether the desired level of L is less than or greater than the land L he owns. Free entry and exit are assumed to prevail at the beginning of the period. If the desired level of L is zero, the farmer exits from the market. The farmer enters the market if L is positive in the current period and was zero in the previous period. Thus, entry and land decisions are assumed to occur simultaneously at the beginning of the period."
Once an incumbent or a new farmer commits to L, only nonland inputs can be varied and entry is blocked ex post. Nonland inputs are applied continuously throughout the period. At the end of the period (t = 1), application of nonland inputs are completed and output is realized.
Ex Post Composite Input Decision
Because land is a primary input whose supply is relatively inelastic, we distinguish land from other nonland inputs. Important nonland inputs include a primary factor, labor, and a host of intermediate inputs such as combines, specialized machinery, chemicals, and raw materials purchased from other competitive industries. These nonland inputs are lumped together and are treated as a composite input X for two reasons.12 First, the proportion of the labor force employed in the agricultural sector is relatively small in most developed countries. For example, increases in labor demand in the agricultural sector are not likely to affect significantly the wage rate in the United States. Thus, the wage rate is assumed to be exogenous. Second, the intermediate inputs used in agriculture are supplied by competitive firms in other sectors, and their prices are assumed to be given. For instance, increases in demand for farm chemicals may raise the prices of chemicals in the short run, but because they are produced by competitive firms, the long-run supplies of the intermediate inputs are perfectly elastic.
Let w and r be the price of the nonland composite input and the rental price of land, respectively. At the beginning of the period, the representative producer observes target price p* and input prices w and r and chooses the amount of land L to cultivate. Land is a quasifixed input; it is a variable input at the beginning of the production period, but once land is allocated the producer can only alter nonland inputs. Ideally, farm size can be measured by capacity or output level. A farm with 600 acres and one worker is not necessarily larger than a farm with 500 acres and 10 workers. Because producers are assumed to use identical technology, however, factor intensities are the same for all farmers. Thus, land is a useful proxy for "farm size" or production capacity.
The total output generally depends on the distribution of the composite input over the production period. For simplicity, we assume that the total quantity of the composite input X is applied to land at a constant rate and application of the nonland input is completed at the end of the period.13 Then the output depends on the total amounts of X and L employed, and it is given by a concave production function,
To eliminate indeterminacy of optimal output, we assume that F(.) is not linearly homogeneous.
Land decision is made at the beginning of the period (t = 0). The composite input X is continuously applied to fixed land until the end of the period (t = 1). Because the total application of X is completed at t = 1, the composite input decision is termed an ex post decision. The competitive producer's problem at the end of the period is to choose X to maximize profit, 
where the land rent r is assumed to be fixed at the market clearing Differentiating (1') with respect to p* yields dq/dp* = (aq/ap*) + (dqldL)(aL/Op*).
Thus, if L is a normal factor, the ex ante supply is more elastic than The zero profit condition states that, for any target price p*, there exist many input price combinations that yield zero profit. We now derive the input price frontier in the (w, r) space that satisfies the zero profit constraint in equation (5). Let aL L/q and ax X/q be the amounts of land and the composite input used per unit of output produced, respectively. Note that profit maximization requires cost minimization. The least cost combinations of inputs to produce one unit of output generally depend on input prices. Thus, the input-output ratios can be written as aL = aL(w, r) and ax = ax(w, r). The unit cost is g(w, r, q) = aL(w, r, q) r + a(w, r, q)w.
The zero profit condition in (5) can be rewritten p* q -g(w, r, q)q = 0, where c(q, w, r) = g(w, r, q)q is total cost. The first order condition for optimal output is p* -gq -g = 0,
where gqq -g = cq is marginal cost. Dividing the zero profit condition by q gives p* -g(w, r, q) = 0,
which defines a unit cost frontier in (w, r) space along which unit cost is equal to the target price p*. In view of (7), we have gq = 0. In other words, long-run equilibrium is characterized by a minimum of the unit production cost.
Three Propositions on Long-Run Equilibrium
There are two ways to assess the long-run impacts of a change in the target price on land rent. If agriculture accounts for a large fraction of gross national product, a general equilibrium production model with two sectors-agriculture and manufacture-can then be developed to assess the impacts of changes in the target price. In contrast, land is specific to agriculture and the quantity of land supplied is fixed in the short run. Oscar R. Burt maintains that "the amount of farmland available may change gradually over time, but these changes are relatively insensitive to farm prices because they emanate from government appropriations" such as reclamations, highway developments, and urban growth.20 Moreover, to control program cost, the government often limits annually the quantity of land eligible for price subsidy programs. Thus, the supply of land is likely to be relatively inelastic even in the long run.
Because the supply of land is not perfectly elastic, new producers can enter the market only by bidding up the rental price of land. Thus, an increase in the target price is accompanied by increases in producer surplus and rental price of land. However, this induced increase in land rent causes the representative producer to use nonland inputs more intensively. If the long-run equilibrium farm size L* decreases (increases) with p*, then entry (exit) of firms continues until a new market equilibrium is restored at a higher land rent. We will show below that, under reasonable conditions, an increase in the target price only raises land rent and does not affect the long-run equilibrium farm size L*. In this case an increase in the target price initially raises entry pressure, but the latter is completely offset by the rise in rental rate and no entry actually occurs.
Recall from equation (8) that a given target price p* defines a factor price frontier g(w, r, q) or a locus of input prices (w, r) that are consistent with the long-run equilibrium. If the price of the composite input w is fixed, however, there exists a unique rent r* -r*(p*, w) that yields zero profit. Let the asterisk (*) denote that the variable is evaluated in long-run equilibrium, corresponding to a target price p*. Let w and g2(w, r, q2) . If the factor prices do not change as in the short run, an increase in the target price will benefit every producer, that is, lr/O8p* = q* > 0. At p* every producer expects to earn a positive economic profit, and hence entry pressure exists. If the rental price of land is fixed at r* or rises below the new equilibrium level r2,* entry occurs. Free entry assures that, in the long run, the producer surplus vanishes and the market rental price rises to the equilibrium level, r*. Thus, if the supply of the composite input is perfectly elastic and free entry is guaranteed, then in the long run higher target prices cannot benefit landless producers.21 The landowners eventually extract the entire surplus from a higher target price that would accrue to producers if rent were fixed.
Price Elasticity of Equilibrium Rent
We now investigate how the long-run equilibrium rent r*(p*, w) responds to a change in the target price. Observe that the zero profit condition does not directly depend on the aggregate land supply. Thus, If the land supply is fixed, EL is zero and i reduces to e. If A'(r) ? 0, then rental income rises faster than rent. PROPOSITION 1. Assume that entry is free and the supply of the composite input is perfectly elastic. Then the price elasticity of longrun equilibrium rent is e (dr*/dp*)(p*/r*) = 1/OL > 1, and the price elasticity of long-run equilibrium rental income is -(dR*/p*)(p*/R*)
= (1 + EL)/OL > e.
If the rental price of land were perfectly flexible or entry free, then the equilibrium adjustment would occur within a single production period. If the market adjustment of rent is slow, the price elasticity of current rent will be less than e and can be less than unity. Let E* be the long-run price elasticity of rent, and let Et If it takes more than one period for the rent to reach the long-run equilibrium value r*, the elasticity of current rent with respect to the target price, Et = (Or,/Opt)(Pt/rt), will be less than the long-run equilibrium price elasticity of rent, E*. If the target price is raised and maintained for many periods, Et will approach its limiting value E* p* q*/ r*L* as t approaches oo. Because the average land share rL/pq for corn in Illinois between 1959 and 1982 was about 30%, the implied value of E* was 3.33. Since Et/E* = 0.41, roughly 40% of equilibrium rent adjustment was made within a year. At this rate, more than 98% of equilibrium rent adjustment will be within 3 years (.4 + .6 x .4 + .36 x .4 = .9841). For practical purposes, it can be argued that in agriculture the long run spans three production periods.
A nonlandowner producer will capture some benefits in the first year following an increase in subsidy in writing a contract for an annual lease. If the increased target price persists for 3 years, a long-term lease would benefit the nonlandowner producer even more. Incentives for writing a long-term lease would be moderated, however, if there is uncertainty in future target prices.
Scott's data also show that sizable profits accrue in the short run to producers who do not own the land. In the short run, the zero profit condition does not hold, and hence p* q* = rL + wX + rn, or p* = aLr + axw + p,
where aL = L/q and ax = X/q are the input-output coefficients, and p = ur/q is per unit profit. In terms of proportional changes, equation Recall that profit wr(p*, w, r) is zero and the optimal value of land L* is the farm size in long-run equilibrium. To obtain the equilibrium farm size, we use p = 0 and solve for L in equation (9). An increase in the target price affects the equilibrium farm size L* directly, holding rent constant, and also indirectly via the adjustment in the equilibrium rent r*. The total effect on the equilibrium farm size is dL*/dp* = aLlap* + (aL/ar)(dr*/dp*), where the first term on the right side is the direct effect, and the second term is the indirect effect. Using equations (3a) and (3c), we obtain dL*/dp* = (q*/L* -dq/dL)Fxx/p*A = (1 -8)qFxx/p*AL*, (10) where 8 = (dqldL)(L/q) is the land elasticity of output. PROPOSITION 2. Assume that the total land supply is fixed and entry is free, and consider an increase in the target price p*. Then i) L* decreases, increases or remains constant according to whether 8 is less than, greater than, or equal to unity, and ii) N* increases, decreases, or remains constant according to whether 8 is less than, greater than, or equal to unity.
This proposition indicates that the land elasticity of output plays a key role in determining the impacts of price supports on the industry structure. It is widely believed that land yield (q/L) is roughly independent of farm size. In this instance, changes in the target prices have no impact on the long-run equilibrium farm size L*.
Bruce Differentiating q* with respect to p* yields dq*/dp* = aq/ap* + (dqldL)(dL*/dp*) = Oq/Op > 0.
Recall that the equilibrium farm size L* and the number of firms N* are not affected by changes in the target price. But long-run equilibrium output q* rises with the target price, because the representative producer uses the nonland input more intensively as the equilibrium rental price r* rises. Note that 6 = 1 implies that dN*/dp 3 years (1927, 1953, and 1978) . For all commodity groups the long-run supply elasticities rarely exceeded unity, except for dairy in 1972. These data indicate that the long-run supplies of these commodities are generally price inelastic.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In the case of net rent in Illinois between 1959 and 1982, the current price elasticity of rent exceeded unity, and about 40% of long-run rent adjustment was made within a year. This example shows that equilibrium rental adjustments may not be fully made within a single year. This empirical evidence is consistent with Gardner's position that landless producers gain from commodity programs in the short run. But the theory supports D. Gale Johnson's observation that commodity programs mainly benefit landowners in the long run. Although producers receive price subsidies, free entry and perfectly elastic supply of the composite input insure that landowners eventually extract the entire benefits from price subsidies and that landless producers do not benefit from commodity programs in the long run. Since about 60% of the U.S. farmland is owned by operating producers, roughly 60% of the benefits of commodity programs goes ultimately to U.S. commodity producers in the form of rent.
It should be noted that our analysis is based on the assumption of homogeneous producers and points to the need to analyze commodity programs with heterogeneous producers.34 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, some conjectures can be made. Farmers facing price uncertainty may have access to identical production technology, but risk attitudes may differ considerably among farmers. Thus, even in a given commodity group, farm sizes will differ among farmers depending on their risk attitudes. Since each farmer maximizes expected utility, farm size will be determinate even if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Other things being equal, farm size would be inversely related to risk aversion. While a marginal farmer earns a normal return from the risk he or she takes, less risk averse farmers may earn positive economic profits even in long-run equilibrium.
Notes
* We are grateful to Ed Tower, William Meyers, Bruce Gardner, and two anonymous referees for their comments that resulted in substantial improvements in the paper. The usual caveats apply. (Journal Paper no. J-13968 of the assume that prices are known and that there is no extra cost that must be committed for entry decision. Thus, in effect both entry and land decisions are made at the beginning of the period.
12. Although breaking down the nonland inputs into labor and other intermediate inputs may make the model more general and the analysis more complex, little additional insight is obtained.
13. Thus, the changes in output arising from nonuniform application of the composite input are not captured by the production function. This simplification is used for practical purposes. For instance, corn yields can be fairly accurately predicted by total plant-available nitrogen and soil moisture in late spring.
14. Consider the problem of minimizing cost C = wX + rL to produce a 34. Nielson, Rausser, and de Gorter (n. 10 above).
